Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that free will is constituted by a set of cognitive abilities and that free will is threatened not by determinism but perhaps by certain empirical theories. In Chapter 1, I argue that the question of free will should not be focused on the compatibility question. Rather, we should take a position which rejects that either deterministic or indeterministic causation is necessary for free will. Indeterminism does not necessarily threaten free will, and most of the threats thought to be posed by determinism are in fact distinct from that metaphysical position. The remaining threats posed by determinism cannot be answered by any legitimate libertarian theory. ;Instead, I suggest in Chapter 2 that free will should be analyzed in terms of the Knowledge Condition: our ability to know ourselves---specifically to know our conflicting motivations, to know which of them we really want to move us, and to know how to act accordingly. I analyze these cognitive abilities in light of Frankfurt's theory of identification and discuss the relations between free will, free action, and responsibility. ;The sort of knowledge required by this theory of free will may be threatened by empirical theories about human nature. In Chapter 3, I specifically examine theories and experiments in social psychology that suggest we have a limited understanding of why we do what we do, and I offer responses to these threats showing that the scope of their impact is limited and that they may actually augment our free will by increasing our self-knowledge. ;The knowledge required for free will may also be threatened by certain philosophical theories about the nature of the human mind. In the Epilogue I discuss eliminativism and epiphenomenalism as case studies for such threats. I conclude by suggesting that we may make significant progress on the problem of free will if we come to better understand the nature of subjective consciousness. ;Finally, I offer an Appendix in which I discuss the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities required for us to have free will, specifically our ability to understand our own mental states.