Abstract

Kant, J.G. Herder, G.W.F. Hegel, Descartes and others explore the phenomenon of freedom as a fun­damental personality traits. In particular, Kant argued that identity formation is due to the independent behavior. On the other hand a person - is not only freedom, but also the limitations of the latter, that the conquest of the mind and behavior of individual morality. Ideas anthropocentrism were characteristic of JG Herder, who declared value outstanding personal­ity that has a higher and independent sense and gives them everything it touches. Unlike modern times, where private property is considered as one of the conditions for the formation of a free individual, Marx advocates its destruction, which will, in his opinion, the full development of the in­dividual, and will not work for subsistence and creative needs. In this approach, the individual recognizes its utter dependence on the social system, mode of production and distribution in the country. That identity as a separate unit, which acts as the center of social construction, does not take place, according to Marx. Profound analyze the problem of «self» personality S. Kierkegaard, J.-P. Sartre, Heidegger, Jaspers, in which its uniqueness and intrinsic value derived from responsibility for the world and for itself. The main value being claimed identity, which creates free. Since the beginning of the twentieth century in Western Europe formed the ethics of self-worth individual, whose members - D. Royce E. Mounier, Benedetto Croce, B. Bozanket - see it as being a unique inner world. The meaning of life thinkers believe samovtilennya personal­ity, and the only criterion of truth last - moral values himself, with individual actions may not be consistent with social norms. Since the mid-twentieth century yevropotsentrychne attitude recedes into the background, but instead formed a wide culturologic attitude, which required the recognition of the intrinsic value of individual cul­tures. These global changes lead to a change in understanding personality. First of all, it is no longer under­stood ontologically.