The experiential presence of objects to perceptual consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, sense impressions, and perceptual takings
Abstract
Discussion of W. Sellars's rediscovery of experiential presence continues with special reference to J. McDowell's and J.F. Rosenberg's recent articles on Sellars's understanding of perception, and a later effort by Sellars to cast light on the intimate relation between sensing and perceptual taking. Five main sections respectively summarize my earlier discussion of Sellars's account of experiential presence, draw on Rosenberg's explication of two Sellarsian modes of responding to sense impressions, consider McDowell's claim that Sellars's perceptual takings are shapings of sensory consciousness, introduce Sellars's Kantian late account of experiential presence, and return critically to McDowell's thesis: Sellars's perceptual takings, notwithstanding their being purely conceptual actualizations, give us awareness of the very pinkness of a pink ice cube