Consciousness and reality: Hegel's philosophy of subjectivity

The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (1976)
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Abstract

With the rise of analytical philosophy the criticism against Hegelianism has become increasingly shrill, and signs of an embarrassment that Hegel's philosophy should ever have arisen are noticeable in such inftuential works as those of Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach, to mention but a few. However, many contemporary philosophers stress what is called subjectivity, conceiving reality as susceptible of methodical analysis only to the extent that it is in and for the subject. What is more, they not only insist on the importance of the subject for philosophy, but maintain that the subject must be conceived as the principal determinative of true objectivity. Since knowledge depends for its possibility on the inseverable correlatives of consciousness and reality, they would grant that a proper importance must be given to both subject and object. Still, exemplifying the relational principle within the unity of a dual structure, the subject serves as an exclu sive agent that provides ingress into the meaning of the object.

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