Defeasibility and memory knowledge

Mind 91 (July):432-437 (1982)
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Abstract

This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. (A “traditional” account of memory knowledge locates whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-impression.) The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that Carl Ginet’s four-part defeasibility-type definition of memory knowledge that p is either too weak or too strong, and (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-traditional account.

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Andrew Naylor
Indiana University South Bend

Citations of this work

On Seeming to Remember.Fabrice Teroni - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 329-345.
Justification in memory knowledge.Andrew Naylor - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):269 - 286.

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