Toward a Just Work Law: Exit Options, Relationships, and Regulation

Dissertation, University of Michigan (2014)
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Abstract

My dissertation comprises three inter-related chapters, all of which explore the nature of work law and critically analyze the prevailing emphasis on matters of contract. The Escape Plans of Mill and Jefferson: I discuss these thinkers’ unsuccessful “escape plans” to minimize wage work. Mill advocated cooperative, worker-owned firms, while Jefferson favored farming the vast American frontier. I explore whether, if realized, either proposal would have satisfied the demands of justice. I argue that such proposals are normatively deficient because they lead us mistakenly to assume that so long as the law provides alternatives to wage labor, it can justly leave work relationships in an unregulated, Dickensian state. In reply, I contend that we have no just alternative to engaging in the messy and difficult task of regulating the workplace. Revising the Roles of Master and Servant: I critically examine the claim that work law is best understood as part of contract law, arguing that this view is neither descriptively nor normatively instructive. Rather than understanding work law as a set of restraints on freedom of contract, we should see it as creating and defining special relationships, much like the codified definitions of marriages and corporations. I trace the development of work relationships through the common law of “master and servant” and more recent statutory modifications. I argue that the history and present form of work law are not consistent with the contract-centered view of work law as “interfering” with an otherwise free labor market. Competing Ideologies and the End of the Lochner Era: I examine Howard Gillman’s critique of the view that early-20th Century Supreme Court Justices sought to advance policy preferences rather than interpret the law. Gillman reconstructs the legal basis for their decisions, thus undermining the claim that they merely pursued laissez faire policies. However, Gillman then claims that the Justices who overruled liberty-of-contract in West Coast Hotel had no principled basis for their decisions. In response, I argue that West Coast Hotel was not only based on a plausible interpretation of constitutional law, but also the best outcome with respect to justice.

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Stephen Craig Nayak-Young
San Francisco State University

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