Abstract

The law surrounding death and dying has failed to keep pace with medical technology. Medical science has made it possible to sustain human existence past the point where the competent adult might rationally conclude that life is no longer worth living. Nevertheless, the current state of the law often makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual to have unfettered control over his act of dying. Seriously ill patients who seek termination of artificial life support may find themselves thwarted by criminal sanctions which prohibit aiding or abetting a suicide. A general proscription of suicide is firmly rooted in the common law, and the prevalent view of the psychiatric community holds that a desire to terminate one's own existence presents prima facie evidence of mental instability. Although the state has a legitimate paternalistic concern in the welfare of its citizens and may justly intervene to prevent unwarranted acts of self-destruction, it must also be recognized that in many instances the option of death may pose the most optimally rational choice in light of an individual's particular circumstances and ends. ;Determinations against medical intervention commonly result in acts which might be characterized as a self-infliction of deadly harm. But an examination of the constitutional right to privacy reveals that privacy protects those decisions which are profoundly personal, intimate, and integral to the control of one's own destiny. That decision which fits this criterion more closely than any other is the decision whether to continue living or not, for intrinsic to the control of one's life is the choice of electing to forego continued life. Hence, the constitutional right to privacy protects the right of the individual--at least under certain circumstances--to terminate his own existence. ;Once the fundamental human right to suicide is recognized by the Supreme Court to be inherent within the constitutional right to privacy, legislation which seeks to infringe this right will be subject to "strict scrutiny analysis." Specifically, such legislation must be shown to advance some compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn so as to constitute the least restrictive means available to sustain its compelling purpose. Thus, although the state may still regulate the manner of exercise of this right, it may no longer flatly condemn all deliberate acts of self-destruction. As such, recognition of the constitutional right to suicide will help ensure that no mentally competent adult will be forced to remain alive against his wishes and best interests