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Four-year-old humans are different: Why?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135 (1996)
Abstract
The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.Other Versions
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Citations of this work
Insights into theory of mind from deafness and autism.Candida C. Peterson & Michael Siegal - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):123–145.
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.
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