Capacitism and the transparency of evidence

Mind and Language 37 (2):219-226 (2022)
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Abstract

Susanna Schellenberg develops a unified account—“capacitism”—of perceptual content, phenomenology, and epistemic force. In this paper, I raise questions about her arguments for a capacitist account of evidential force, and then challenge her claim that such an account, even if correct, demands that our evidence be less than fully transparent to us.

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Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and the internal.John McDowell - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):877-93.
Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
Wide or narrow scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.

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