Evidence, coherence and epistemic akrasia

Episteme 15 (3):313-328 (2018)
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Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Rationality Reunified.Keshav Singh - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.

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References found in this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.

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