From Inputs to Beliefs

Analysis 82 (4):707-716 (2022)
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Abstract

What you believe is typically responsive to what you perceive, what you recall, what inferences you’ve made and various other factors. Let’s use the term ‘input.

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Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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