Propositional justification, evidence, and the cost of error

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216 (2007)
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Abstract

My topic in this paper is a particular species of epistemic justification – a species that, following Roderick Firth, I call “propositional justification.”1 Propositional justification is a relation between a person and a proposition. I will say that for S to bear the propositional justification relation to p is for S to be “justified in believing” that p. What is propositional justification? What is it for S to be justified in believing that p? Here’s my answer.

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Author's Profile

Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
What evidence do you have?Ram Neta - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):89-119.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.

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