Two Legacies of Goldman’s Epistemology

Philosophical Topics 45 (1):121-136 (2017)
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Abstract

Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.

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Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
Upping the Ex Ante Problem for Reliabilism.Matthew Frise - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1047-1054.
Desert Retributivism: A Deweyan Critique.Andrei Poama - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (3):285-303.

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References found in this work

The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
“Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?Roderick Firth - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim, Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 215-229.

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