Vinci's formulation of the Truth Rule

Abstract

On his interpretation, the Truth Rule is intended to provide an epistemic principle that grounds specifically existential knowledge. Vinci builds his account around Descartes' doctrine that "if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may be attributed" (Prin. 1:51, CSM 1:210, AT 8a:25). As Vinci understands it, the Truth Rule is a principle ensuring (roughly) that whatever properties I clearly and distinctly perceive are contained in a substance.

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Lex Newman
University of Utah

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