Abstract

In his new book, _Charles Peirce and Modern Science_ (2022), T. L. Short convincingly presents Charles S. Peirce as a scientific philosopher whose philosophical views were influenced by his empirical and experimental work in geodesy, astronomy, chemistry, and psychology. This includes his treatment of metaphysics, theory of categories, cosmogony, phenomenology or phaneroscopy, semiotics, and normative science. In all of his works, Peirce exemplified the spirit of modern science, not as a system builder looking for final truths, but rather as a fallibilist inquirer who was always ready to refine and revise his conjectures. In these comments, it is first pointed out that there existed a European counterpart to Peirce’s scientific philosophy: the program of “inductive metaphysics,” which is today continued as “abductive metaphysis” by analytic philosophers. Peirce’s contributions to nomological probabilistic explanations are then mentioned as a complement to Short’s treatment of statistical explanation. Finally, it is argued that Short’s remarks about Peirce’s ironical relation to modernity are based on a narrow interpretation of the values and achievements of modernity.