On Recanati’s Mental Files

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):368-377 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his book Mental Files , Francois Recanati develops a theory of mind and language based on the idea that Fregean senses should be identified with ‘mental files’, mental representations whose primary function is to store information about objects. I discuss three aspects of Recanati’s book. The first concerns his use of acquaintance relations in individuating mental files, and what this means for ‘file dynamics’. The second concerns his comments on a theory that I have elsewhere advocated, the ‘sequenced worlds’ or ‘multi-centered worlds’ theory. The third concerns how the mental file approach handles non-doxastic attitudes like imagining

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

A Review of Recanati’s Mental Files. [REVIEW]Hsiang-Yun Chen - 2020 - NCCU Philosophical Journal 44:177-204.
Indexicality, Transparency, and Mental Files.Derek Ball - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):353-367.
Attitudes and Mental Files in Discourse Representation Theory.Emar Maier - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):473-490.
Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files.Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):393-407.
Mental Files in Flux.François Récanati - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-19

Downloads
343 (#81,799)

6 months
82 (#76,319)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dilip Ninan
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Mental filing.Rachel Goodman & Aidan Gray - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):204-226.
Mental Files.Rachel Goodman - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (3).
The Metaphysics of Mental Files.Simon Prosser - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):657-676.
Attitudes and Mental Files in Discourse Representation Theory.Emar Maier - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):473-490.
Why my I is your you: On the communication of de se attitudes.Emar Maier - 2016 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

View all 18 references / Add more references