Wanting to know whether

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Abstract

It is argued that that the desire attributed to an agent, X, in sentences of the form ‘X wants to know whether P’, is not X’s overall desire for ‘X knows that P or X knows that “not P”’, but rather X’s expected conditional desire for knowing the truth about P, given the truth. An implication of this account for distributive justice is discussed.

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Ittay Nissan-Rozen
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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References found in this work

Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Contractualism and Social Risk.Johann Frick - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (3):175-223.
On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.
The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.

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