Is Stalnaker inconsistent about indicative conditionals?

Abstract

Stalnaker's 1975 motivates an account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals that seems in tension with the truth-conditions he offers. This paper discusses how best to resolve this tension.

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2009-01-28

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Daniel Nolan
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Conversation and conditionals.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):211 - 223.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Indicative conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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