General covariance, gauge theories and the kretschmann objection

In Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 110--123 (2002)
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Abstract

How can we reconcile two claims that are now both widely accepted: Kretschmann's claim that a requirement of general covariance is physically vacuous and the standard view that the general covariance of general relativity expresses the physically important diffeomorphism gauge freedom of general relativity? I urge that both claims can be held without contradiction if we attend to the context in which each is made.

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John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections.Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.) - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Symmetries and invariances in classical physics.Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani - unknown - In Jeremy Butterfield & John Earman (eds.). Elsevier.
Geometric foundations of classical yang–mills theory.Gabriel Catren - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (3):511-531.
Time and Structure in Canonical Gravity.Dean Rickles - 2006 - In Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha T. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

What price spacetime substantivalism? The hole story.John Earman & John Norton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
The Hole Argument.John D. Norton - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:56 - 64.

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