Teiginio cogito ergo sumlegitimiškumo problema

Problemos 58 (2000)
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Abstract

Šiame straipsnyje aptariama karteziškojo teiginio cogito ergo sum legitimiškumo problema, jos susiformavimo prielaidos bei jos vieta bendrame R. Descartes’o filosofijos kontekste. Be to, straipsnyje išryškinamos teiginio cogito ergo sum legitimiškumo problemos sąsajos su substancialistiniu mąstymu. Raktažodžiai: intelektas, intuicija, dedukcija, silogizmas, substancija THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATION OF PROPOSITION COGITO ERGO SUM Alvydas Noreika Summary This article deals with one of central problem of Cartesian philosophy - that of connection between thinking and being supposed by proposition cogito ergo sum.The problem is: By which operation of mind can we perceive connection betweencogito and sum - whether by intuition, or deduction? In short, whether this proposition - is syllogism, or not? According to Descartes, the connection is perceived by straight insight of mind. But logical operator ergo existing between cogito and sum shows that cogito - is premise, sum is conclusion, and proposition cogito ergo sum - is abridged syllogism or entimema. Descartes agrees that it is possible to think the general presupposition prior to the proposition. But in order to avoid the pitfall of syllogistic structure he uses analogy with problem of universalia. The general presupposition is a generality, and the proposition is an individuality. We know the individuality prior to the generality. Nevertheless, the connection is grounded by syllogism. The proposition is an entimema. Omitted general presupposition is "Every accidens points to substantia ". Key word: intellect, intuition, deduction, silogism, substance.

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