Death stings back: a reply to Sorensen

Analysis 66 (1):82-92 (2006)
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Abstract

Lucretius argues that death does not harm the person who dies. Harm could occur only if a person’s future non-existence were harmful. But one’s future non-existence is no more harmful than one’s non-existence before birth. Since a person is not harmed by lacking existence before birth, one is not harmed by lacking existence after dying.

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10.1093/analys/66.1.82

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Citations of this work

On behalf of spore gods.Alasdair Richmond - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):98-104.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1986 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford and New York: Oup Usa.
The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument.William Lane Craig - 1998 - In Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide. New Brunswick, N.J.: Georgetown Univ Pr. pp. 383-383.

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