Thoughts are facts in possible worlds, truths are facts of a given world

Dialectica 45 (4):273-288 (1991)
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Abstract

Mentalism preserves the triad: brain's state — thought — state of affairs whereas phy‐sicalism identifies the former two elements of it. Both stands meet the famous difficulties. But these presuppose ontological actualism. On the ground of ontological possibilism, claiming the existence of all possible worlds, one may identify a thought with the corresponding state of affairs in a possible world. Yet, possibilism turns out to be too narrow to carry such an identification and requires a significant generalization

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Citations of this work

On the concept of nothingness.Leszek Nowak - 1997 - Axiomathes 8 (1):381-394.

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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1962 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
The Probable and the Provable.Samuel Stoljar - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):457.

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