Can knowledge be reached?∗

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4 (1-4):219-227 (1961)
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Abstract

There is no amount or quality of evidence such that if that amount or quality is reached, then truth is reached. If, therefore, a proposition must be true in order to constitute knowledge, knowledge is never reached. If certain standards of evidence are satisfied I have the right to say ?I know?, and the right does not depend on how one answers the question whether it is right what I say

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Scepticism and absurdity.Ingemund Gullvåg - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):163-190.

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