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Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305 (2004)
Abstract
Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
The disunity of consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
References found in this work
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Representational Genera.John Haugeland - 1998 - In Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 171-206.
When is information explicitly represented?David Kirsh - 1990 - In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
When is Information Explicitly Represented?David Kirsh - 1992 - The Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science:340-365.
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