Abstract

In the specialized and often peculiar conversation of philosophers, some speak of themselves and of others as willing our actions. Usually, they intend to imply thereby a distinctive kind of psychological event, one that lies at the origin of every instance of intentional action. This thesis, of course, has become highly controversial. Many argue that despite much traditional philosophical theorizing committed to such an essential feature of action, there is no basis for it in ordinary speech, introspection, or sound theory about the mind’s role in behavior. But even in everyday conversation, we do say of ourselves and of others that we or they often are trying to do various things, sometimes successfully and sometimes not. Since we not only say this but are aware of it often enough, sound theory should provide a place for this feature, at least. Now some recent philosophers seek to forge a link between the ordinary notion of ‘trying’ and the philosophical notion of ‘willing’. They fix upon special cases where agents experience themselves as acting while little or no bodily movement occurs. It seems that the activity there experienced must be purely psychological, a striving to achieve an effect that we often term “trying”. If this is right, perhaps it can be argued cogently that such a psychological activity is present in ordinary cases as well.