Biological mistake theory and the question of function

Abstract

Mistake-making is a common feature of life; it can be given a rigorous theoretical framework. The theory, though, faces a challenge from the ‘functions debate’. Perhaps mistakes are merely malfunctions, so a theory of mistakes requires a stance on functions. However, mistake theory views mistakes as distinct phenomena, not just malfunctions. The functions debate is largely separate from the concept of biological mistakes. While the selected effects theory, for instance, may retain its place within a pluralistic view of function, embracing a robust concept of normativity that goes beyond a relatively narrow conception of function can drive future experimental research.

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David S. Oderberg
University of Reading
Christopher J. Austin
Durham University

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