Finality revived: powers and intentionality

Synthese 194 (7):2387-2425 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying the way in which powers work.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,343

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intentionality and physical systems.Margaret A. Boden - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):200-214.
Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum.William A. Bauer - 2022 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Why mental explanations are physical explanations.Julian M. Jackson - 1995 - South African Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):109-123.
Dennett's reduction of Brentano's intentionality.Brent Silby - 2008 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7.
Intentionality, Politics, and Religion.Mohammed Azadpur - 2015 - Religious Inquiries 4 (8):17-22.
Intentionality and the Physical: A Reply to Mumford.Ullin T. Place - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):225-231.
Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant.Tim Jankowiak - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:623-649.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-03-11

Downloads
155 (#151,900)

6 months
10 (#281,857)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David S. Oderberg
University of Reading

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Getting Causes From Powers.Stephen Mumford & Rani Lill Anjum - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Rani Lill Anjum.
Laws in nature.Stephen Mumford - 2004 - New York: Routledge.

View all 40 references / Add more references