Abstract

A Reintroduction of the Mirroring View in Allen Buchanan’s The Heart of Human Rights Alan Buchanan places great important on his rejection of the Mirroring View in The Heart of Human Rights. The Mirroring View is that, in order for a legal right to exist, there must be some corresponding and antecedently existing moral human right. His rejection of this view is tied closely with is overall aim of altering the methodological approach to human rights. He proposes that the new approach should focus on the institutions, processes, and functions of the system which he calls the Practice. Further, Buchanan is interested in justifying the system as whole as well as justifying its individual parts. He holds that the Mirroring View does not provide either the necessary or sufficient grounds for the creation of legal rights, and that moral rights themselves are unable to justify the system as a whole. I argue that not only do Buchanan’s arguments prove insufficient for a rejection of the Mirroring View, it is also the case that a robust conception of the Mirroring View will benefit the overall project that Buchanan has without precluding Buchanan’s pluralistic and complex view for justification of the current system of human rights, and the current Practice. The more robust Mirroring View will benefit the system in a number of ways. First, the justification of the system as a whole and of particular organizations functions, and the authority of the system will become stronger. Second, evaluations of legitimacy can become more determinate. Third, if the robust Mirroring View is adopted, a view towards what aspects are currently lacking in the international system can be helpfully answered. Thus, I propose that rather than a rejection of the Mirroring View, an adoption of a more robust view be made wherein the formation of legal rights proceeds but does not directly mirror notions about morality expressed as human rights. The result will alter, to a minimal amount, some of Buchanan’s further characterizations of the system. With little of Buchanan’s beneficial remarks altered, the added benefits of a robust Mirroring View ought to indicate the plausibility and desirability of its adoption in discussion about the Practice. My project begins with an evaluation of Buchanan’s rejection. I attempt to show that it should not cause us to reject the Mirroring View. Next, I propose the robust Mirroring View and enumerate the theoretical benefits it can provide. Lastly, I reply to some important objections to the revised approach.