On the Common Logical Structure of Classical and Quantum Mechanics

Erkenntnis 89 (4):1507-1533 (2024)
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Abstract

At the onset of quantum mechanics, it was argued that the new theory would entail a rejection of classical logic. The main arguments to support this claim come from the non-commutativity of quantum observables, which allegedly would generate a non-distributive lattice of propositions, and from quantum superpositions, which would entail new rules for quantum disjunctions. While the quantum logic program is not as popular as it once was, a crucial question remains unsettled: what is the relationship between the logical structures of classical and quantum mechanics? In this essay we answer this question by showing that the original arguments promoting quantum logic contain serious flaws, and that quantum theory does satisfy the classical distributivity law once the full meaning of quantum propositions is properly taken into account. Moreover, we show that quantum mechanics can generate a distributive lattice of propositions, which, unlike the one of quantum logic, includes statements about expectation values which are of undoubtable physical interest. Lastly, we show that the lattice of statistical propositions in classical mechanics follows the same structure, yielding an analogue non-commutative sublattice of classical propositions. This fact entails that the purported difference between classical and quantum logic stems from a misconstructed parallel between the two theories.

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Andrea Oldofredi
University of Lisbon

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin, The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.

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