Algumas razões para levar a sério a metaindução pessimista

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):269 (2014)
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Abstract

The present paper aims to give an account of pessimistic meta-induction and reply to some representative realist authors who want to consider PMI a fallacy. Most of that accounts are misinterpretations of Laudant’s ideas and fails the target. This work intend that PMI is neither a induction nor a reductio, but a skeptic challenge. If this is right then PMI could not be a fallacy and the realism cannot escape from the task of explain why the success is a good indication for the truthlikeness of the current theories

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References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.

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