The Remnant-Person Problem

In Stephan Blatti Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), Essays on Animalism. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Animalism is the view that you and I are animals. That is, we are animals in the straightforward sense of having the property of being an animal, or in that each of us is identical to an animal-not merely in the derivative sense of having animal bodies, or of being "constituted by" animals. And by 'animal' I mean an organism of the animal kingdom." Sensible though it may appear, animalism is highly contentious. The most common objection is that it conflicts with widespread and deep beliefs about our identity over time. These beliefs are brought out in reactions to fictional cases. Suppose, for instance, that your brain is transplanted into my head. The being who ends up with that organ, everyone assumes, will remember your life and not mine. More generally, he will have your beliefs, preferences, plans, and other mental properties, for the most part at least. Who would he be-you, me, or someone else?

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Eric T. Olson
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
Why animalism matters.Andrew M. Bailey, Allison Krile Thornton & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2929-2942.
The animal, the corpse, and the remnant-person.Andrea Sauchelli - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):205–218.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
Person and Object.Roderick Chisholm - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):281-283.

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