Abstract

Plutarch is committed to geometric atomism, the Platonic theory that derives the material elements from regular polyhedric shapes. An essential feature of this theory is that qualitative properties are not primitive, but supervene on more fundamental, quantitatively describable properties, such as the size, shape, mass or weight of the atoms, their solidity, position, arrangement and kinetic interactions. Plutarch recognises that the geometric account provides the causal explanation for phenomenal and other qualitative properties. He praises Plato and Democritus for their theoretical accomplishment in this domain. Yet in his reply to Colotes, he criticises Epicurus and Democritus because of their atomism, and claims that it is not possible to derive qualities from qualityless atoms. Plato’s theory is different, he claims, as it does not make the primordial corpuscles qualityless and unchanging. I examine three possible explanations for this discrepancy: Plutarch’s argument against Democritus serves purely polemical purposes; Plutarch is not fully aware of the theoretical force and import of geometric atomism; he disposes of a more sophisticated account of geometric atomism, containing assumptions unknown to us that save the model from the objections directed at Democritus.