Abstract

Olympe de Gouges (Montauban 1748 - Paris 1793) is best known as the author of the Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne of 1791. De Gouges' intellectual contribution and political commitment, however, encompassed a broader field than just gender relations and the assertion of women's civil and political rights. De Gouges in fact publicly intervened on many of the central issues of the political and social context of the French Revolution, including public health, social policies, voting by head or by order, the execution of the king, divorce and, as we shall see in detail in the following pages, slavery and the slave trade. In the paper, I first reconstruct the context of de Gouges' production, with a focus on the institution of slavery in revolutionary France (§ 1). I then dwell on the political function of theatre at the time of the Revolution and trace the controversial events that marked the staging of L'esclavage des noirs (§ 2). I intend to show, more specifically, how de Gouges' reflection on the theme of slavery makes her an extraordinary interpreter of the spirit of the Enlightenment. Indeed, in it, she demystifies the supposed naturalness of existing inequalities and shows how, on the contrary, they are the result of historical injustices aimed at protecting specific interests and maintaining privileges. I then highlight de Gouges' originality within the philosophical paradigm of natural law. Compared to thinkers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, de Gouges is distinguished by the consistency of purpose with which she makes use of natural law. Indeed, de Gouges' reference to natural law always has emancipatory intentions and is never aimed at justifying existing inequalities (§ 4). Finally, I propose an interpretation according to which de Gouges is an advocate of a particular type of universalism, an anti-essentialist universalism that takes its starting point from concrete situations of injustice and inequality rather than from general and abstract principles, and which I will suggest we call ‘universalism of differences’ (§ 5).