Abstract

In order to characterize the conception of dignity, the author quotes some examples of its derogation. The most drastic is the example of its derogation by the staff of concentration camps. Analysis of such examples leads to a formulation that dignity is manifested by those who know to defend certain values, recognized by themselves, when with the defence of these values the sense of their own value is connected. This is a pure formal characteristic. Its content can vary together with variations of values which are defended. Generally, the observation of Hobbes seems to be justified which permits to associate dignity with the feeling of power and to consider self-degradation as a symptom of weakness. The use of the conception of dignity introduces a new scale of values into morality: it divides behaviour into honourable and degrading, while honour and degradation are not measured by the social effect of a deed. Among the known principles securing the dignity of a man two deserve to be mentioned: the principle of Kant which does not allow to consider a man exclusively as a mean leading to an end and the principle of Marx according to which man should be considered as the highest being.