Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff

Philosophical Papers 39 (2):209-237 (2010)
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption

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References found in this work

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A completeness theorem in modal logic.Saul Kripke - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):1-14.

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