Abstract

No Abstract Alvin Plantinga's free will defense is based on the idea of transworld depravity. Plantinga claims that if an essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which the instantiation of that essence only does what is right. If every essence suffers from transworld depravity, then it is not possible for God to actualize a world in which there is moral good but no moral evil. I begin by describing possible worlds that imply it is impossible for every essence to suffer from transworld depravity. I then show how to modify the concept of transworld depravity to avoid this problem, and to allow for the possibility that every essence suffers from transworld depravity. This new formulation of transworld depravity has an interesting consequence, and this leads to an alternative free will defense that is not based on the concept of transworld depravity. I introduce the concept of an unobtainable world, and use this to develop an alternative version of the free will defense that is preferable to one based on the concept of transworld depravity.