Naïve realism and the problem of illusion

Analytic Philosophy 63 (3):174-191 (2022)
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Abstract

As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F – appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way – i.e., without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.

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Søren Overgaard
University of Copenhagen

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References found in this work

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The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.

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