Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to develop a method of doing ontology using ideas chiefly from Carnap and Quine. As traditionally conceived, ontology is realist insofar as it aims to say what there is, and not merely what there seems to be. Realism has, however, come under increasing attack, and Paul Moser has recently given a strong argument supporting a conditional agnosticism about ontological claims. His argument is examined and defended. As a consequence, the task of ontology is construed such that it is not committed to realism, nor to any metaphysical view generally. The method of ontology does however, contrary to Quine's views, employ a notion of analyticity. An account of analyticity is offered that aims to meet all of Quine's strictures. A version of physicalism, called Logical Physicalism, is then developed and defended against three alternatives:, dualism, idealism, and neutral monism. Although physicalism is often understood as entailing a thesis about the nature of mind, namely, that it is either physical or perhaps non-existent, Logical Physicalism aims to be neutral with respect to theories of mind; it aims at being a non-reductive physicalism