Abstract

This paper focuses on the analysis of the fair equality of the concept of opportunity from the perspective of the moral and reasonable justifications brought to support positive discrimination. Although contemporary democratic societies guarantee the absence of discrimination by securing the formal equality of opportunity, this seems to be insufficient to balance opportunities. The Rawlsian model has gained ground, by advancing a redistribution of the resources to support the disadvantaged ones, which is implemented through special measures. The compulsory quotas for admission to higher education or public institutions, addressed to some disadvantaged groups, are one of the effective means of implementing fairness. As this system has shattered the principle of reward judging by one‟s merits, and ending up as a form of inverse discrimination of the majority groups, it is necessary that we analyse the arguments and the boomerang effects of the special measures. The undertaking proposed by the present paper is structured around highlighting the ethical aspects, as well as the consequences resulting from the arguments in favour of positive discrimination. Do we have the moral obligation to make up for the past inequalities suffered by some groups? Does preferential treatment really ensure the genuine integration of such groups? Do special measures contribute in creating social justice? Without the claim of having responded definitively and exhaustively to these questions, this paper attempts to emphasise the ethical dilemma that raises when special measures favour one group or another, when a group is protected judging by only one criterion, or when only an implementation area is selected.