Abstract

Modern discussions of ethics are framed in terms of what John Dewey called 'either/or' conceptual maps. Dewey's infamous claim is that such 'either/or' analyses fail to capture the subtlety and complexity of the moral life. He argued that there is no substitute for examining our circumstances in light of our ideals and determining in that context what we ought to do. Furthermore, Dewey thought that previous moral theorists had developed a view of human agency and reason that did not match with empirical reality at the end of the 19th century. Dewey's naturalistic account of human agency, his analysis of the role of moral theory, and his conceptions of the ideals of growth and democracy were all designed to show how we can overcome the standard dichotomies and solve the philosophical 'problems' that emerge from them. ;I believe Dewey's ethics is a plausible alternative to the 'virtues/principles' dichotomy current in the literature. To do this, I will need to outline five conceptual dimensions over which contemporary ethicists tend to argue. The five dimensions are: Habits vs. Intelligence. This chapter will show how Dewey overcomes the standard distinction between mechanistic pictures of action-production and so-called 'autonomous' accounts of rational action; Desire and Belief in motivation. Here I will be showing how Dewey's account of human interests and activity supersedes the debates over whether belief or desire is the primary cause of action; The liberal vs. the communitarian ideal of the self. In this chapter I will argue that liberalism's inadequate ideal of civic character, and communitarianism's lack of a grounding for such an ideal, are surpassed by Dewey's ideal of democratic character; Human Flourishing. Dewey's major teleological principle, Growth, is here placed between Kant's and Aristotle's conceptions of the ideal end of moral development, and Meta-Ethics and Practical Reason. I argue that Dewey's account of the Good, Right, and the objectivity of Moral Judgment enable his ethics to avoid significant criticisms of his pragmatism and instrumentalism, leaving it as a plausible and attractive alternative to current deontological and teleological theories.