Can Plants Desire? Aspects of the Debate on desiderium naturale

In Fabrizio Baldassarri & Andreas Blank, Vegetative Powers: The Roots of Life in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Natural Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 91-104 (2021)
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Abstract

During Antiquity and the Middle Ages, two opposite traditions – namely the Aristotelian and the Platonic – expressed antithetical positions regarding the question whether plants were able to desire. The issue in question is closely related to the question of the sense of plants and their possibility to have sense perception. Over time, the two philosophical issues developed differently. In the Aristotelian tradition, the question of sense in plants has continuously been treated in a way that denies plants sensation, while the issue of desire in plants developed differently, opening a more heated debate. Some of the positions expressed by the most authoritative exponents of the two traditions will be taken into account in this chapter, starting with Plato and Aristotle, examining in particular the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis. This will be followed by an examination of the Neoplatonic positions, which represent a moment when Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines somehow intersect; thus, Plotinus and Isaac Israeli’s position will be considered. Finally, some of the most important medieval exponents will be considered, precisely Averroes, Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, who show that the question of desire in plants has metaphysical implications.

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