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Against representationalism
International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347 (2016)
Abstract
It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies: the value of phenomenal consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2024 - AI and Society 39 (6):3005-3015.
The significance argument for the irreducibility of consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):349-407.
Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge).Adam Pautz - 2016 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Routledge.
What Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness?Adam Pautz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):1-2.
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
References found in this work
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
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