Abstract

The so-called "problem of temporary intrinsics" is purported to provide convincing evidence against object endurance and for object perdurance through intrinsic change. In fact, the "problem" can be generated only by the prior assumption of perdurance and can be dismissed only by the prior assumption of endurance, and thus is a poor arbitrator between the two. A version of endurance theory is proposed which avoids perdurantist objections leveled against extant endurance theories, including adverbialism. ;A third proposal, presentist endurance , has been criticized for failing to allow for the supervenience of truth on being; a temporally-sensitive construal of this notion allows the presentist to answer this objection, but does not provide her with any advantage over an endurance theory committed to eternalism . ;Eternalist endurance is compared with perdurance; the two are found to be at a theoretical equilibrium. The possibility of Minimalism---the belief that we ought to suspend judgment with respect to the exact mechanism of persistence---is explored and rejected. A further consequence of perdurance, that it entails counterpart theory in order to account for accidental intrinsics, is judged to be insufficient grounds for abandoning perdurance. ;Recognizing that the proposed theory of endurance is restricted to the commitments of perdurance, an alternative account of object description and change is proposed. Abandoning the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, a theory based on relational constancy is described, according to which properties are best conceived of as relations. Those properties important to describing an object can be expressed as highly constant relations; changes in such relations are significant to the object. Such a theory incorporates both intrinsic and extrinsic essentials, pure and impure intrinsics and extrinsics in a unified account. This theory's openness to relations strengthens endurance; an endurance theory which describes objects and object change based on a theory of relational constancy has many advantages to offer over perdurance