Paradoxes of Confirmation

Abstract

We often want to say that inductive evidence supports some conclusion more or less strongly. This is often put as a matter of "e confirms h", where confirmation comes in degrees.

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The paradoxes of confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.
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