Dipendenza e indipendenza ontologica: il punto di vista del neoscetticismo

Esercizi Filosofici 16 (1):71-90 (2021)
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Abstract

This contribution aims to explore scepticism’s implications with respect to the notions of ontological dependence and independence, referring especially to Peter Unger’s New Scepticism. First, a reconstruction is offered of the fundamental theoretical perspective acting as the backdrop of Unger’s scepticism, in relation to his volume Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (1975). Then, light will be shed on the implications that this perspective has on the ontological level, referring also to some of Unger’s sceptical and nihilistic philosophy’s subsequent developments. At last, a critical interpretation is suggested of the author’s proposed solution to the radical outcome of his philosophy, in light of the notions of ontological dependence and independence.

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Lisa Paravan
University of Trento

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