The Liberal Paradox: Some Interpretations When Rights Are Represented As Game Forms

Analyse & Kritik 18 (1):38-53 (1996)
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Abstract

The paper seeks to interpret the liberal paradox in a framework where individual rights are represented as game forms. Several close counterparts, in this framework, of Sen’s theorem are considered, and their intuitive significance is discussed.

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Citations of this work

Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.

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References found in this work

Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters.Jonathan Riley - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):121.

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