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How privileged is first-person privileged access?
American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):1-15 (2010)
Abstract
Many philosophers agree that mental states are subject to privileged first-person access. Exactly what privileged, first-person access means is controversial, but it seems that, while our third-person access to mental states is only indirect because it depends on behavioral observation, first-person access seems to be direct because it depends on no such mediationAuthor's Profile
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Illuminating the dark matter of social neuroscience: Considering the problem of social interaction from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific perspectives.Marisa Przyrembel, Jonathan Smallwood, Michael Pauen & Tania Singer - 2012 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6.
The Second-Person Perspective.Michael Pauen - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):33 - 49.
The Metaphysical Problem of Other Minds.Giovanni Merlo - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):633-664.
The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness.Dylan Ludwig - 2021 - Dialogue 60 (3):435-446.
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