Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity

Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,072

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-19

Downloads
156 (#147,642)

6 months
10 (#411,161)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Douglas Lavin
University College London
George Pavlakos
University of Glasgow
Ulrike Heuer
University College London
1 more

Citations of this work

Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.
A New Defense of the Motive of Duty Thesis.Benjamin Wald - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1163-1179.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Clarendon Press. pp. 2004--28.

View all 10 references / Add more references