Why is willing irrelevant to the grounding of (any) obligation? : remarks on Arthur Ripstein's conception of omni-lateral willing

In Sari Kisilevsky & Martin Jay Stone (eds.), Freedom and Force: Essays on Kant’s Legal Philosophy. Portland, Oregon: Bloomsbury (2017)
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George Pavlakos
University of Glasgow

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