Abstract

Saba Bazargan-Forward (2022, Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability), conceives of agency as divided into two functions: a deliberative function (deciding what to do) and an executive function (acting on that decision). He claims that these two functions can distributed across multiple agents, and that this has important moral consequences: if you outsource the executive function to me, then the practical reasons you take there to be, for A-ing, are relevant to whether I can permissibly A and to how my A-ing reflects on my character. However, the natural way of understanding the 'divided agency' model --- i.e. that in cases of divided agency the executor literally acts on the deliberator's reasons --- is problematic and doesn't seem to reflect Bazargan-Forward's considered view, while his considered view doesn't seem to support his moral judgments, either about the permissibility of the executor's behaviour or of their character. I suggest an alternative to Bazargan-Forward's 'divided agency' model and consider what moral judgments it supports.